Alternative school teachers whose positions were eliminated when school board outsourced to private religious school have valid Establishment Clause claim
Smith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. 06-6533 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2011)
Abstract: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (MI, OH, KY, TN), sitting en banc (all active judges participating in considering and deciding the case), has ruled that teachers at a Tennessee school district’s alternative school, who lost their positions when the school board decided to close the school in favor of outsourcing services to a private religious school, have municipal taxpayer standing to file suit claiming the board’s decision violated the federal and state constitutions’ Establishment Clauses. It rejected, however, the teachers’ procedural and substantive due process claims, and held that the individual board members enjoyed legislative immunity from the suit. Because of the court’s decision regarding legislative immunity, it did not reach the question of whether individual board members were entitled to qualified immunity.
Facts/Issues: Facing budgetary constraints for the upcoming 2003-04 school year, the Jefferson County Board of School Commissioners (JCBSC) voted to eliminate the alternative school and the positions of the teachers and principal. After deciding to close the alternative school, JCBSC voted to outsource alternative school services for Jefferson County students to Kingswood School (KS). The board’s officially stated reason for the closure and outsourcing was financial considerations due to budget cuts. KS is a religious school that specializes in providing treatment programs for students with behavioral and emotional problems. The principal and two teachers filed suit in federal district court against JCBSC and its members in their official and individual capacities.
The suit alleged that the defendants’ actions had violated the principal and teachers’ rights under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the establishment and due process claims. Defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion, but granted the defendants’ motion, in part for lack of standing.
Ruling/Rationale: The Sixth Circuit held that the principal and one of the teachers have municipal-taxpayer standing to bring a claim under the Establishment Clause. As a result, it remanded that claim to the district court for further proceedings. In regard to the procedural due process claim, it found no violation. As to the substantive due process claim, because that claim was addressed directly by the Establishment Clause claim, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of that claim. In addition, it concluded that the individual board members were exercising their legislative authority when they decided to eliminate the alternative school and the plaintiffs’ positions; therefore, the individuals were entitled legislative immunity from the suit.
The appellate court began by analyzing whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring the Establishment Clause claim. Rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention that they have individual standing to bring the claim, the Sixth Circuit concluded that while the plaintiffs had suffered a substantial injury, i.e., loss of their jobs as a result of the board’s decisions, they failed to show that they are within the class whose rights were infringed by outsourcing the alternative school services to a religious school. Specifically, although the plaintiffs suffered economic loss, the board’s decisions did not result in loss of religious freedom associated with violation of the Establishment Clause’s mandate of separate of church and state.
Instead, that loss would allegedly be visited on students assigned to KS and their parents. Acknowledging that in general an individual cannot claim standing in federal court to vindicate the rights of a third party, the Six Circuit stated that there is an exception to the rule against third-party standing if: (1) “the party asserting the right has a ‘close’ relationship with the person who possesses the right;” and (2) “there is a ‘hindrance’ to the possessor’s ability to protect his own interests.” The court found that the plaintiffs could meet the first prong of the test via the teacher-student relationship. Regarding the second prong, the court “discern[ed] no indication here that the students or their parents face any obstacle in litigating their rights themselves.”
The Sixth Circuit concluded, however, that two of the plaintiffs ”have standing to challenge the Kingswood outsourcing as an expenditure of municipal funds alleged to be in violation of the Establishment Clause.” Plaintiffs seeking to establish municipal-taxpayer standing face a less rigorous injury standard than those seeking standing as federal or state taxpayers, explained the court, and may fulfill the injury requirement merely by pleading an alleged misuse of municipal funds. The court found no precedent supporting the defendants’ argument that in order to establish municipal-taxpayer standing a plaintiff must ”show that an unconstitutional act shrinks the public treasury.” The Sixth Circuit stated: ”In sum, the rule that plaintiffs must show depletion of the public fisc in order to access the courts has no foundation, explicit or implied, in the binding decisions of the Supreme Court. And with good reason. Determining whether a municipality ‘lost’ or ‘saved’ money raises a host of implementation problems.” It stressed that adopting the defendants’ reasoning would allow a local government to evade suit simply on the basis that its more cost effective to violate the U.S. Constitution.
Turning to the procedural due process claim, the Sixth Circuit succintly said, ”Because the Board engaged in legislative activity when it made the budgetary determinations that eliminated the alternative school, we hold that the Board did not violate the teachers’ procedural-due-process rights.” Likewise, it quickly disposed of the substantive due process on the ground that because “the teachers’ Establishment Clause claim directly addresses the conduct at issue, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the teachers’ substantive-due process claim.” Lastly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the individual board members were entitled to legislative immunity from suit because in deciding the fate of the alternative school and its staff, the members were carrying out a legislative function.
Smith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, No. 06-6533 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2011)
[Editor's Note: The Sixth Circuit decision was divided, with the chief judge filing a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Another judge, joined by two other judges and the chief judge, filed a dissenting opinion. The Associated Press (AP) in Education Week reported Chief Judge Alice Batchelder saying that the only people who could have protested the board's decision would be the parents of the students sent to Kingswood. "The teachers' interest is to be compensated for losing their jobs," Batchelder wrote. "That is hardly the same as the students' interest in not being compelled to worship." The AP article is available below.]
Source: Education Week, 2/15/11, By AP
