Federal district court concludes former principal was not speaking as private citizen when she reported predecessor’s financial and administrative irregularities
McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 09-1150 (C.D. Ill. Jun.7, 2010)
Abstract: A federal district court in Illinois has granted a school district summary judgment on a former principal’s claim that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that the principal’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because she spoke pursuant to her official duties.
The district court also ruled that even if the principal had spoken as a private citizen, her speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not on a matter of public concern, but rather involved a personal grievance. Lastly, the court concluded that the First Amendment claim failed because the school district’s decision to terminate the principal was not motivated by a desire to retaliate against her.
Facts/Issues: Julie McArdle was employed by Peoria School District No. 150 (PSD150) as the principal of Lindbergh Middle School (LMS). Her immediate supervisor PSD150 Academic Officer Mary Davis, was the former principal of LMS. McArdle’s tenure at LMS was marked by a number of complaints from parents regarding her conduct and personality. At the time she was embroiled in the controversy with school district officials over her performance, McArdle discovered that Davis had engaged in a number of administrative and financial irregularities while LMS’s principal. When she attempted to discuss the situation with Davis, Davis told her that the matter had been cleared up during an audit.
McArdle continued her investigation, uncovering more irregularities. Davis was eventually charged with several felony counts in connection with those irregularities. However, before Davis’ alleged criminal behavior came to light, McArdle learned that the school board intended to terminate her. At that point, she emailed the superintendent and the vice-president of the board outlining Davis’ theft and other alleged official misconduct. In addition, she filed a police report with local law enforcement. At the time the board met to decide whether McArdle should be terminated, the only people who knew about the charge were Davis, the superintendent and the vice-president of the school board.
After the board voted to terminate McArdle, she filed suit against PSD150 in federal district court, alleging that she had been terminated in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. McArdle also made a number of state law claims. PSD150 sought summary judgment on the retaliation and the state claims. McArdle sought and the court granted her motion for voluntary dismissal of some of the claims.
Ruling/Rationale: The district court granted PSD150′s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim. In determining whether McArdle had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the court found that the remaining issues were: ”whether McArdle engaged in constitutionally protected speech and whether a reasonable factfinder could determine that her speech was the motivating factor behind her termination.”
To determine whether McArdle’s reporting of Davis’ alleged misconduct was protected speech, the court first had to decide whether she was speaking as a private citizen. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) that a public employee is not speaking as a private citizen for First Amendment purposes when she speaks pursuant to her official duties. Based on the evidence presented here, the court found, “no reasonable jury could conclude that McArdle was acting as a private citizen when she discovered Davis’ alleged criminal activity and reported this activity to District supervisors.”
Even if McArdle had been speaking as a private citizen, her speech still would not enjoy First Amendment protection because it was not on a matter of public concern, the court decided. Given that she only reported the alleged misconduct after learning that she was to be terminated by the board, the court found “there is no issue of material fact that the context and form of McArdle’s speech was a personal grievance in response to the District’s announcement that it would be terminating her contract.”
Turning to the question of whether McArdle’s speech was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate her, the court decided, “no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the District was motivated by McArdle’s future speech when deciding to exercise the early termination provision of her contract.” The record established that although some board members saw McArdle’s email regarding Davis’ alleged misconduct, both the superintendent and the vice-president of the board had already decided to terminate McArdle and communicated such to her before she publicized the alleged misconduct.
Lastly, the district court disposed of McArdle’s arguments that the reason given for her dismissal was pretext, pointing out that McArdle had ample opportunity to correct her conduct; and not all the complaints came from Davis. The court similarly rejected McArdle’s argument that Davis had engaged in prior restraint of her speech by trumping up parents’ complaints about McArdle’s conduct. It found McArdle’s reliance on Davis’ invocation of having her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during her deposition, along with the fact that Davis was not a decision-maker, insufficient facts upon which to sustain the claim.
McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, No. 09-1150 (C.D. Ill. Jun.7, 2010)
[Editor's Note: In March 2011, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (ME, MA, NH, PR, RI) ruled that a speech and language therapist whose contract with a local branch of a state agency was not renewed after she questioned the legality of an agency regulation to parents and advised them to seek outside assistance, stated a valid claim for First Amendment retaliation against the state agency and its director.
The panel concluded that the facts alleged in the complaint against the local branch and director of the state agency were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the claim because the facts stated: (1) the therapist spoke as a private citizen on a matter of public concern; (2) the therapist’s interest in speaking and the public’s interest in the speech outweighed the state’s interest in avoiding disruption in the workplace; and (3) her protected expression was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision not to renew her contract. A summary of the opinion is available below.]
