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Maine Dept. of Ed. drafts new rules on use of restraints and seclusion on students in public schools

The Maine Department Education (MDE) has released a draft of its new rules governing the use of restraint and seclusion on students in public schools, reports the Bangor Daily News. Some children’s rights advocates have expressed concern about the definition of restraint and the process laid out for secluding a student from others.

One of those advocates, Diane Smith Howard, a staff attorney for Maine’s Disability Rights Center, said the proposed rules overall are a vast improvement over what is already on the books. However, Smith Howard, who spent several months developing recommendations with a group of others, said she and others intend to contest some provisions that have been changed from what the group recommended. “Many of the things we found important are included, but I do have some serious concerns,” said Smith Howard.

Of chief concern to Smith Howard are the definitions for restraint and seclusion. In the case of physical restraint, Smith Howard and the other group members were successful in eliminating the words “therapeutic restraint” from the rule. However, MDE’s addition of the word “forcible” in the definition opens schools up to legal ramifications, she said.

Smith Howard also took exception to a single word she said the Department of Education inserted into the definition for seclusion. Smith Howard said the intent of the stakeholders on this point was to make sure a student is never locked in a room, but the Education Department’s draft defines seclusion as a student being “physically prevented from leaving” the seclusion room.

Deborah Friedman, MDE’s director of policy and programs, said she couldn’t discuss those points in detail because it would impinge on the rule-making process, but she said the department has made some changes to the stakeholders’ recommendations in order to clarify their intent or make decisions where the group could not reach consensus. “The department staff tried to stay as much as possible consistent with the consensus-based group,” she said. “We did make some changes where in our judgment they were needed.”

Smith Howard said the proposed rule, despite its problems, is a vast improvement from the current rule, particularly because it installs more follow-up procedures for educators after a restraint or seclusion of a student, and because it defines a complaint process for parents and families. Still, Smith Howard said she wishes the draft rule set stringent timelines for those processes to unfold.

Source: Bangor Daily News, 11/11/11, By Christopher Cousins

[Editor's Note: MDE's proposed rule on restraints and seclusion is open for public comment until December 16, 2011.

In April 2011, Legal Clips summarized an article in the Jackson Clarion Ledger reporting that the Southern Poverty Law Center was alleging that students, including special education students, at Jackson Public Schools’ Capital City Alternative School were being handcuffed for hours as punishment for minor infractions, such as not wearing a belt and talking back.

Also in April 2011, Legal Clips summarized an article in the Palm Beach Post reported that the Palm Beach County School Board (PBCSB) had increased limitations on the restraints that can be used on special-needs students.  PBCSB’s new policy limits the use of restraint by district employees to those instances where a student poses a danger to himself or others. The previous policy allowed the use of restraint when a student’s behavior was causing a “high magnitude of disruption.” It also bans seclusion, where a student is involuntarily confined alone.]

 

 

Indiana Attorney General says it’s unconstitutional for district to turn over bus service to organization that charges fees

According to an Associated Press (AP) report in Education Week, Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller issued a non-binding legal opinion stating that it’s unconstitutional for school districts to end free school bus service by turning transportation over to outside agencies. Zoeller also said that he will ask the official state auditor, the State Board of Accounts, to review a suburban Indianapolis district’s transportation arrangement that charges parents fees for children to ride buses to and from school.

The Franklin Township Community School Corp., citing budget troubles, sold its buses to an education cooperative that now charges as much as $47.50 per student per month to provide transportation. “Under Indiana’s Constitution and statutes, a public school corporation cannot charge fees for students to ride a bus to school to receive the public education to which they are entitled. The school cannot charge bus fees directly, and they cannot charge bus fees indirectly by outsourcing the driving to a third party,” Zoeller said.

Franklin Township Superintendent Walter Bourke issued a statement saying administrators were reviewing the legal opinion with their attorneys. The district contends it is not involved in the contract between parents and the bus service. The mother of two Franklin Township students has sued the district over the bus fees , and her attorney said he planned to seek class-action status on behalf of about 8,000 families in the district.

Zoeller’s opinion said Indiana law would allow parents independently to contract jointly with bus drivers to provide transportation if the school district did not, but said that was not the case with this district. Here, the school board contracted first with the cooperative and then imposed the arrangement on parents, which was unlawful. Zoeller said if a State Board of Accounts audit finds that the school district has appropriated or used funds without legal authorization, his office could try to recover the money from the responsible parties.

“It is easy to understand how financial constraints might lead school corporations to difficult funding choices, which in turn have unintended consequences. Many parents who cannot or will not pay the unconstitutional school bus fee are now forced to drive their children to and from school,” Zoeller said. “However, the option chosen by Franklin Township Schools cannot be justified and should be discontinued.” Zoeller issued a similar non-binding opinion in 2010 saying that districts could not directly charge bus fees.

Source: Education Week, 11/11/11, By AP

[Editor's Note: The Indiana Attorney General's Official Opinion dated November 10, 2011 says that parents may jointly contract with a company to provide transportation services only if the school district does not provide the service at all, and the parent group gets the arrangement approved by the governing body of the school corporation, as specified by state statute. 

In November 2011, Legal Clips summarized an article in the Indianapolis Star reporting on the suit against Franklin Township public schools by parent Lora Hoagland over the school district’s decision to eliminate its free bus service and replace it with a nonprofit company that charges a fee for bus transportation. The editor's note links to a summary of a July 2010 Indianapolis Star article discussing the Attorney General's previous opinion regarding charging for bus service.]

ACLU resumes lawsuit over alleged unconstitutional student fees after California’s governor vetoes enforcement bill

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has resumed its suit, says the San Diego Union-Tribune, against the State of California alleging lax enforcement of the Constitutional ban on mandated fees for public school students. The ACLU had put the lawsuit on hold pending a bill to establish a complaint process and require school districts to audit compliance. Gov. Jerry Brown vetoed the bill last month, so the ACLU has once again taken up its legal fight.

In 1984, the California Supreme Court ruled that both curricular and extracurricular activities are covered by the state Constitution provision that guarantees a free education for all students. The court held that improper fees “can neither be corrected by providing waivers to indigent students, nor justified by pleading financial hardship.”

In his veto message, Brown said education needs to be free, and said the proposed legislation goes too far. “Local district compliance with this right is essential, and those who fail should be held accountable,” Brown wrote. “But this bill takes the wrong approach in getting there.” The Association of California School Administrators supports the governor’s veto. “AB 165 expanded the (audit) requirement process by adding the review of illegal fees and ensuring that reimbursement had been achieved. These audit requirements would have added significant mandated costs to school districts that are already underfunded and understaffed,” the group’s website states.

Attorneys for the ACLU maintain the law would have been a cost-saver for districts. “Right now if a parent alleges they were charged an illegal fee, they can ask for a reimbursement and if they don’t get it, they can go to court and that’s an expensive process,” said David Blair-Loy, legal director for the San Diego and Imperial Valley chapter of the ACLU. “Everyone has to follow the law, and budget stress is no excuse to break the law.” He added, “We thought the bill was a fair, reasonable and appropriate solution to the statewide problem of school districts charging illegal fees.”

Source: San Diego Union-Tribune, 11/15/11, By Ashly McGlone

[Editor's Note: In December 2010, Legal Clips summarized an article by the Associated Press in the San Diego Union-Tribune reporting that the State of California had reached an agreement with the ACLU of Southern California (ACLU-SoCal) that would ensure school districts no longer charge parents extra fees for textbooks, art supplies and other basic educational items. The agreement reportedly ended a suit brought by a coalition of groups led by ACLU-SoCal alleging the extra fees violated the state constitutional guarantee of free and equal public education.

ACLU-SoCal attorney David Sapp noted that the agreement also required the state to send letters to every California public school district and charter school operator explaining the settlement and encouraging them to review their fees.  The state also promised to seek new laws that would broaden annual state audits to include determining whether schools charged illegal fees. The laws also would permit parents to complain about illegal fees and to be reimbursed.]

 

Houston school board votes to revise its ethics policy to prevent board members from discriminating based on sexual orientation

Houston school trustees voted unanimously, says the Houston Chronicle, to revise their own ethics policy to ban themselves from discriminating based on sexuality. The vote was prompted after trustee Manuel Rodriguez Jr. ran a campaign ad that was criticized as anti-gay. In the ad, Rodriguez urged voters to oppose his opponent because he supported gay rights and had a male partner and no children. Rodriguez voted with his colleagues to expand the ethics policy but made no public comments. He has issued an apology to those offended by the ad.

Trustees Carol Mims Galloway and Juliet Stipeche spoke out against the ad, and trustee Anna Eastman made the motion to expand the ethics policy. Trustees plan to bring back a revised policy next month. Galloway said she would apologize on Rodriguez’s behalf. She said she believed he supported the district’s anti-discrimination policy. “But I guess when it comes to politics,” she added, “people forget.”

Source: Houston Chronicle, 11/10/11, By Ericka Mellon

[Editor's Note: The events described in this article demonstrate how school boards collectively and board members individually lead by example. For another example, read the November 2011 Legal Clips summary of an article in the Topeka Capital-Journal reporting that Topeka Unified School District 501 Board of Education (TUSD501) was considering policy additions that bar discrimination against students and employees based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The TUSD501 board  unanimously approved the first reading of language adding the words “sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and expression,” to district policies dealing with discrimination against students and employees.

Cindy Kelly, TUSD 501′s attorney, said the policy additions were recommended by the U.S. Department of Education in an advisory noting that bullying and harassment of students due to sexual orientation or gender identity is rising. “This will provide an internal mechanism to help kids understand that they have a way to deal with such harassment,” Kelly said.]

Massachusetts and others seeking NCLB waiver

Massachusetts has submitted a proposal to the U.S. Department of Education (ED) seeking to replace some of the No Child Left Behind Act’s (NCLB) strictest provisions with a more flexible system that would require the state’s public schools to show steady improvement over the next six years, says the Boston Globe. The state’s proposal would give schools more latitude to reach academic goals than NCLB currently allows. The plan calls for schools to cut in half the rate of students failing to reach proficiency in English, math, and science on standardized tests by 2017. Schools that consistently fall short would face stricter state oversight.

By comparison, NCLB requires that all students reach proficiency in math and English by 2014. Opponents of Massachusetts’ plan criticize the proposed shift as a retreat that would let schools off the hook and erode hard-won progress at long-troubled schools. Proponents, however, believe the change will maintain high standards while providing a more accurate picture of overall school performance. ”We will flag schools with the greatest achievement gaps,” said Mitchell Chester, the state’s education commissioner. “We will call them out.” ED is expected to grant the waiver that would make it official, and the plan would take effect next school year (2012-2013).

Although the state is seeking a reprieve from federal standards, the new proposal shares many of the law’s aims and would continue its emphasis on testing and identifying those schools where performance lags. The MCAS (state standardized test) would still be the primary measuring stick. Many educators have chafed at the federal measure, calling it punitive and unrealistic, and say the broad rebukes are akin to crying wolf. Based on the most recent round of MCAS results, for instance, more than 90 percent of Massachusetts school systems missed requirements under the federal law.

State officials, however, noted the difficulty of their goal. Over the past six years, the proposal stated, just 16 percent of Massachusetts schools reduced their proficiency gaps in English by half, while 19 percent did so in mathematics.
The Massachusetts proposal would usher in a new system that builds on accountability measures approved in last year’s sweeping effort to overhaul state education rules. Since the law, the state has tapped 34 schools with chronically low test scores for overhauls, and early returns have shown appreciable gains.

The new assessment system would consider more than just student MCAS scores in judging school systems and individual schools. Among many factors, it would also weigh how much students improve, how many score in the advanced category, and how many drop out of high school. Supporters said adjusting the federal requirements to more achievable levels would help identify the schools most in need.

Critics, on the other hand, believe the relaxed standards would reduce the urgency around bringing all students up to speed. ”This looks like it pushes back the date and halves the expectations,” said Jamie Gass, who directs the Center for School Reform at the Pioneer Institute. Christopher Anderson, president of the Massachusetts High Technology Council, said he opposed the waiver request, saying the current standards are paying dividends.

Source: Boston Globe, 11/15/11, By Peter Schworm

[Editor's Note: According to brief articles by Associated Press in Education Week, Kentucky and ten other states have submitted applications to the Department of Education for waivers from NCLB's unpopular proficiency standards in time for the first deadline, November 14, 2011. Those states include: Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Tennessee.  The New York Times reported that four of the states that met the first-round deadline were winners of the administration’s Race to the Top grant program: Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts and Tennessee. About 28 states have declared their intention to apply in the second round, the deadline for which is mid-February, 2012.

In September 2011, Legal Clips reported on on U.S. Education Sec. Arne Duncan's letter to Chief State School Officers  announcing the issuance of the Department of Education’s (ED) formal application for states to apply for NCLB waivers.  Sec. Duncan stated: “NCLB requirements have unintentionally become barriers to State and local implementation of forward-looking reforms designed to raise academic achievement.” As a result, Duncan offers state officers “… the opportunity to request flexibility on behalf of your State, your LEAs [local education agencies], and your schools, in order to better focus on improving student learning and increasing the quality of instruction.”

See the editor’s note for background including ED’s “ESEA Flexibility” application documents, NSBA advocacy efforts regarding NCLB flexibility, and Duncan’s authority to issue waivers from the federal law.]

North Carolina district agrees to policy changes after civil rights group files federal complaint on behalf of Latino students

The Associated Press (AP) reports in the Record that Durham school district has agreed to changes in policies affecting Latino students and parents to resolve a complaint against it by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). The school district will strengthen its existing anti-discrimination policy, provide parental notifications and other documents in the native language of a student’s parents and provide interpreters for parents with limited English skills in understanding school policies, among other changes.

The agreement is between the district and the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which had investigated the claim by the law center. As part of the agreement, OCR will continue to monitor Durham schools through June 2013. “We had an opportunity to sit down with the school district and the Office for Civil Rights,” said Jerri Katzerman, the deputy legal director SPLC. “They took immediate and comprehensive steps to remedy the problem.”

SPLC had filed a complaint in April 2011 outlining what it called a pattern of discrimination against Latino students and their families, ranging from scarcity of resources to outright hostility. The center’s complaint noted the district had just three interpreters available for roughly 5,300 students and their families whose primary language is Spanish, and documented an incident in which a substitute teacher pushed a student against a wall and said “go back to your country.”

Some of the changes agreed to by the district are already in effect, including notification to parents about the resources available in their language, a Spanish language page on the district’s web site and the translation of common forms and parental guides. Some of the other changes include a poll of students’ opinions and training for staff members, which will run into 2012.

Durham Superintendent Eric J. Becoats welcomed the agreement with the federal agency. “Our agreement with the Office of Civil Rights has served to make us a better school district for all of our students,” Becoats said. “We will continue to work side by side with students and families representing all cultures.”

Katzerman praised Durham schools’ willingness to volunteer remedies for the items listed in the complaint, and said the district’s response should serve as a model to other large school systems with growing populations of students from families whose primary language isn’t English. “We think it’s great,” she said. “It’s really a commitment from the school system to fix the problem and ensure that what has been suggested or proposed is actually being done,” she said.

Source: The Record, 11/9/11, By Tom Breen (AP)

[Editor's Note: Durham school district was in the news in January 2011, when it agreed to change its gang policy.  Legal Clips summarized an article in the Durham Herald-Sun reporting that Durham Superior Court Judge Orlando Hudson had approved a settlement agreement ending a nearly 5-year-old lawsuit over the constitutionality of the district’s policy. In the agreement, the plaintiffs dropped all claims against the district in return for policy revisions.]

Sua Sponte: NSBA files amicus brief urging Supreme Court to provide guidance on off-campus online speech

The National School Boards Association, along with other education groups, has asked the Supreme Court of the United States to hear a much-publicized case involving student off-campus online speech. Citing confusion among federal courts regarding the standard that applies to public schools’ regulation of student speech that originates off campus, and often online, NSBA said, “This Court’s guidance is critical to assisting school officials in understanding how they may regulate the student expression that now pervades social networking forums without contravening the time-honored principles of the First Amendment.”

In the case at hand, known as J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. below, a Pennsylvania middle school student created on her home computer a spoof MySpace profile page for her principal.  According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which heard and the case en banc  (all active judges participating), the page contained “crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the principal and his family.”  The Third Circuit determined that the school district had failed to demonstrate that it could reasonably forecast that the student’s spoof profile would cause substantial disruption in school. As a result, it held that the district officials’ decision to suspend the student was a violation of her First Amendment right to free speech.

The companion case, Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., similarly involved a Pennsylvania high school student who created a spoof profile of his principal on MySpace.  Again, the profile was disrespectful and lewd.  The district, however, did not argue on appeal that Justin Layshock’s speech resulted in substantial disruption, but that the speech was sufficiently connected to the school campus (as Layshock had obtained a photo from the district’s web site and accessed the profile at school) to allow the school to regulate it.  Finding the connection to the school too tenuous, the Third Circuit found that Supreme Court precedent “does not allow the School District to punish Justin for expressive conduct which occurred outside of the school context.”

These cases, involving very similar facts and decided on the same day by the en banc Third Circuit, have been combined.  Both school districts are have filed petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

In its brief supporting the school districts, NSBA argues that the internet generally, and social networking specifically, have so changed the nature of communication among youth that it is urgent for the Court to provide guidance to school administrators on the bounds of their authority to regulate speech that occurs there.  The Court’s student speech decisions have thus far only addressed speech that occurred on campus, or at a school activity.  Because federal courts are applying these decisions to off-campus online speech in a number of disparate ways, the Court needs to issue a definitive standard that can be used by courts and school officials alike.

NSBA also notes that school officials need some authority to regulate student speech that originates off campus to fulfill the schools’ educational mission to teach the bounds of civil discourse, and to address student bullying. A number of anti-bullying measures at the federal and state level require districts to address bullying that originates off campus. With the lack of a consistent standard in federal courts,  ”[i]t is, therefore, unclear how school districts can comply with federal and state statutes to address bullying that begins off campus without violating the First Amendment. ”

Finally, the NSBA brief suggests to the Court a need for balance in school officials’ authority and responsibility for student off-campus online speech.  Public school administrators should not have to police the internet for offensives student postings.  ”If, however, egregious speech that affects the school community is brought to their attention, they need to be able to act to preserve the learning environment and individual rights.”  NSBA urges the Court to accept the case to provide public school officials some authority and deference to choose the best approach when an incident arises in their schools.

NSBA was joined in the brief by the American Association of School Administrators, American School Counselor Association, Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network, National Association of Elementary School Principals, National Association of Secondary School Principals, Pennsylvania School Boards Association, and School Social Work Association of America.  The brief was authored by Lisa Soronen and Sonja Trainor of NSBA.

NSBA Amicus Brief in support of petition for certiorari in Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder

Legal Clips post on Third Circuit’s en banc ruling in J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.

Legal Clips post on Third Circuit’s en banc ruling in Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 

NSBA Press Release


 

Federal appellate court holds African-American parent stated valid claim that Louisiana district’s student assignment plan is racially discriminatory

Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 09-3971 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011)

Abstract: In a 2-1 split, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled that an African-American parent stated a valid equal protection claim against a Louisiana school district.  The parent claims that the district’s student assignment plan assigns a disproportionate number of “at risk” students to predominantly minority schools in the district, thereby discriminating against minority students based on their race. The panel found that the parent lacked standing to bring the suit on behalf of one of his children, however, and that his claim based on the school district’s 2002 modification of its school feeder plan was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Louisiana.

The panel’s majority agreed with the district court that because the student assignment plan “is ‘race-neutral’ on its face, the critical questions are (1) whether the school board intended to discriminate racially and (2) whether the plan had racially disparate effects.” However, it took exception with the lower court’s conclusion that the plan was not subject to strict scrutiny analysis because the plan “does not explicitly employ racial classifications,” as it assigns students to schools based on their “geographical location.”

The majority found the analysis flawed on two counts: (1) it was unclear, based on the record, how the district court arrived at a factual finding as a matter of law regarding the school district’s lack of discriminatory purpose; and (2) the “court’s assumption that it might be justifiable to use racially-based decisions for the benign purpose of maintaining post-unitary racial balance among the schools in the system is at least in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 US 701 (2007).” It concluded that the evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the school district acted with a racially discriminatory motive.

The majority also found that there were material questions as to whether the plan should be subject to strict scrutiny because the evidence supported the parent’s contention that the plan had a discriminatory effect. Because the facts raised questions as to whether the plan had both a racially discriminatory motive and a disparate impact, along with the district court’s failure to assign the proper significance to the evidence, the majority concluded that the lower court had erred in granting the school district summary judgment under the rational basis test.

Facts/Issues:  After Ascension Parish School District (APSD) was released from a longstanding federal court desegregation order and declared unitary, i.e. “all vestiges of the prior compulsory dual school system had been eliminated to the extent practicable,” it faced overcrowding at one of its middle schools. The district developed a student assignment plan to relieve the overcrowding and to maintain APSD’s unitary status. The plan adopted by the school board maintained the racial balance existing at the time APSD had been declared unitary, but resulted in a disproportionate number of “at risk” students being assigned to predominantly minority schools.

Darrin Lewis filed suit on behalf of his two children against APSD in state court, alleging that minority students are being discriminated against based upon their race by a disproportionate influx of at-risk students into their schools. APSD removed the suit to federal district court and moved for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, granting the motion.

The district court held that Lewis lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of one of the children, and that his claims based on the modification of APSD’s feeder plan were time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court declined to to apply strict scrutiny analysis to Lewis’ equal protection claim based the student assignment plan. Instead, it found that the plan was facially race-neutral, and that Lewis had not presented competent evidence of discriminatory motive by APSD or disparate impact resulting from the plan. Therefore, employing a rational basis analysis, the court upheld the student assignment plan because APSD had a legitimate government interest in alleviating school overcrowding.

Ruling/Rationale: The Fifth Circuit panel, with one judge filing a concurring opinion and the other judge filing an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, affirmed the lower court’s decision regarding the issue of standing and the claim based on the feeder plan, but reversed and remanded the case on the equal protection claim. The panel’s majority first stated its understanding of Lewis’ claim, that “minority students in the East Ascension feeder system were denied equal opportunity by the assignment of a disproportionate number of at-risk students to that system.”

The majority also determined that Lewis was contending that the student assignment plan “is automatically subject to strict scrutiny because it employs racial classifications and, alternatively, that he produced sufficient evidence that [APSD] had a discriminatory motive in assigning a disproportionate number of at-risk students to East Ascension, with corresponding evidence of disparate results.” It pointed out that even a race-neutral government action is subject to strict scrutiny if that action has a “disproportionately adverse effect” that “can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.” Applying strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving its actions are narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest. On the other hand, in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, the rational basis test is applied.

Agreeing with the district court that the student assignment was race-neutral on its face, the majority stated it would address two issues: (1) whether APSD engaged in intention racially discrimination; and (2) whether the plan had a racial disparate impact. The majority first found it “troubling” that the district court had made a factual finding as a matter of law about the APSD’s lack of discriminatory purpose. It also found the lower court’s “assumption  that it might be justifiable to use racially-based decisions for the ‘benign’ purpose of maintaining post-unitary ‘racial balance’ among the schools in the system” flawed because it was “at least in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (citation omitted) (2007).”

Without further review of Parents Involved, the majority concluded that Lewis had raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether APSD had acted with a racially discriminatory motive. It pointed out that “it is unclear how a student assignment plan could calculate the percentage of black students at each school without classifying individual students by race.”

In addition, the majority concluded that there were material questions as to whether strict scrutiny must apply because evidence supported Lewis’s contention that the plan was discriminatory in effect. It found that the “statistics provide some support for Lewis’s contention that [the plan] disproportionately funneled minorities and at-risk students into the East Ascension feeder zone, thereby discriminating against minorities whose educational environments suffer from disadvantages allegedly attributable to high levels of at-risk children.”

The concurring opinion asserted that in addition to the equal protection claim, Lewis appeared to be challenging APSD’s “racial gerrymandering of attendance zones to maintain almost the exact racial balance that prevailed in the schools before the district was declared unitary,” and issue that should also be remanded for trial. The essence of Lewis’s argument, the concurring judge believed, was that APSD had intentionally used racial classifications and engaged in unconstitutional racial balancing.

The concurring judge stressed that the flaw in APSD’s argument, which the lower court adopted, is that maintaining the “racial balance” that existed at the time APSD was declared unitary is not an unconstitutional use of race and should be analyzed under the rational basis standard for equal protections. She contended that such a reason flew in the face of Parents Involved’s holding that a “district’s unitary status conferred no discretion, much less an obligation, on the district to continue to assign individual students based on racial criteria.” The concurring judge stressed that Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved had adopted a “clear statement … that once a school district formerly under a desegregation decree has been declared unitary, ‘[a]ny continued use of race must be justified on some other basis.’”

The dissenting judge found that the majority and concurring opinions’ description of the student assignment plan “as employing explicit racial classifications seem to be geared toward extending the reach of the Supreme Court’s decision (in Parents Involved), to decisions involving the mere awareness of an act’s probable effects on racial demographics.” The dissent also observed that the ”majority and concurring opinions also seem to push for the application of strict scrutiny to student assignment plans merely because decisionmakers show some desire not to upset a school district’s unitary status.” It rejected such reasoning, stating that “if the court were to confine itself to the case before it, the case would not provide an appropriate platform to further either of these ends.” It argued that the only discriminatory intent at issue in this suit, based on the nature of Lewis’s claim, is APSD’s desire to engage in racial discrimination by placing at-risk students in East Ascension and its feeder schools.

The dissent agreed with the majority that the sole issue is whether APSD violated Lewis’s children’s right to equal protection by assigning a disproportionate number of at-risk students to East Ascension and its feeder schools. It agreed with the lower court that because of the racially neutral nature of plan, it was subject to rational basis scrutiny, not the strict scrutiny standard reserve for governments actions involving racial classifications. The dissent contended that “a compilation of demographic information, even racial demographic information, does not by itself suggest a racial classification or a facially race-conscious decision.”

The dissent concluded that the evidence relied on by the majority in finding a racially discriminatory motive failed to address the question of “whether [APSD] acted with an intent to discriminate through the disproportionate placement of at-risk students in schools attended predominantly by minorities.” As a result, the dissent declined to apply strict scrutiny and, instead, applied the rational basis test. Based on a rational basis review, the dissent, like the lower court, determined that Lewis’s equal protection claim failed. It also found the “majority’s attempt to relate the instant case to Parents Involved is troubling for several reasons.” For example, “any claims Lewis may have had related to assigning students to schools based on race are not before us.” It also noted that “the holding in Parents Involved pertained only to plans that expressly use race to determine which school a student will attend and thus does not speak to the matter before us.”

Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 09-3971 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011)

[Editor's Note: Based on the reasoning employed by both the majority and the concurring opinions, the use of demographics that include racial composition will leave school district student assignment plans susceptible to being found unconstitutional under Parents Involved. In June 2010 Legal Clips summarized a Pennsylvania  federal district court's decision in Student Doe 1 v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. holding that a school district’s use of racial demographics to redraw the attendance zones for its two high schools did not violate African-American students’ rights under section 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the redistricting plan, which took away the ability of students who live in the area of the school district with the highest concentration of African-American students to attend the high school of their choice, did not discriminate on the basis of race in violation of either the Equal Protection Clause, section 1981 or Title VI.] 

DOJ responds to Alabama AG’s questioning of its authority to request student enrollment and attendance records

CNN reports that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has responded by letter to questions asked by the Alabama Attorney General (ALAG). ALAG Luther Strange had questioned DOJ’s authority to demand extensive records on school enrollment and attendance in the current school year as part of DOJ’s investigation into whether Alabama’s new immigration law is discriminatory. In its response, DOJ asserted that attorneys from its civil rights division have the authority to investigate Alabama schools for discrimination based on immigration status, and will continue to do so.

Alabama’s new law, designed to curb illegal immigration, includes a mandate for public schools to inquire about the immigration status of students, among other things. A U.S. appeals court granted DOJ’s request for an emergency injunction for that portion of the law, but allowed other controversial sections to be enforced.

DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Thomas Perez responded directly to Strange’s letter demanding to know DOJ’s legal basis for its requests of 39 school districts. In response, Perez noted his department had received multiple complaints from Alabama and cited three federal statutes, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Perez also asked Strange why he was involving himself in the issue at all.

“It is our understanding that you do not represent the school districts that we have contacted. Please let us know if that understanding is correct so that we may proceed accordingly,” Perez said. “As we receive additional information, the Civil Rights Division and other Federal agencies will be evaluating the potential for violation of federal laws in Alabama, including civil rights laws.”

ALAG Strange has received support for his opposition to DOJ’s investigation from U.S. Senators Jim DeMint (R-SC), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), and David Vitter (R-LA), who said they would attempt to block funding for the lawsuits and to introduce legislation barring the Obama administration from participating in lawsuits over new immigration laws in Arizona, Alabama, and South Carolina. DOJ currently is suing Arizona, Alabama, and South Carolina over their immigration laws and is considering similar action against Utah, Indiana, and Georgia.

Source: CNN, 11/4/11, By Terry Frieden

[Editor's Note: On November 5, 2011, the Associated Press reported in the Houston Chronicle that ALAG Strange had sent a letter to DOJ asking to be told what legal authority DOJ had to obtain the information. "Otherwise, I will assume you have none, and will proceed accordingly," Strange wrote. He did not elaborate on his next step. Alabama's interim school superintendent, Larry Craven, advised school superintendents to hold off on providing any information to DOJ until the department and the attorney general resolve their differences.

In November 2011, Legal Clips summarized a CNN report that DOJ had issued a letter to Alabama school districts to make sure they are abiding by federal law, which declares that a child may not be denied equal access to schools based on his or her immigration status. In the letter, DOJ’s Civil Rights Division requests each school district to describe its enrollment practices regarding immigrant students and to provide data on student withdrawals and absences. DOJ quotes existing law stating that denying innocent children the benefit of schooling because of their immigration status is unconstitutional.]

 

Iowa appellate court rules school district improperly disciplined student newspaper advisor for allowing publication over administration’s objections

Lange v. Diercks, No. 11-0191 (Iowa App. Ct. Nov. 9, 2011)

Abstract: The Iowa Court of Appeals has ruled that a school district improperly reprimanded the faculty advisor of a high school student newspaper for allowing student journalists to publish articles that district officials believed violated the limited restrictions on student speech set out in the state’s student free expression law. The appellate court rejected the school district’s argument that the state law was a codification of the student speech standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Instead, it determined that the law was passed “for the purpose of giving students more robust free-expression rights than those articulated by the Supreme Court.”

The court concluded that none of articles cited by school officials as objectionable violated the standard for permissible student expression/speech set forth in the state law; that the advisor was therefore wrongly disciplined for permitting their publication; and that the lower court should direct the school district to remove its reprimands from the advisor’s personnel file.

Facts/Issues: Ben Lange teaches journalism at Waukon High School (WHS). He also acts at faculty advisor for the student newspaper, the Waukon Senior High School Tribe-une. Lange was reprimanded on two occasions by WHS Principal Dan Diercks for allowing students to publish what the administration viewed as inappropriate articles in two different issues of the high school newspaper. Lange filed suit against Allamakee Community School District (ACSD) and Diercks in state court seeking a declaratory judgment to establish that the publications did not violate proscriptions outlined in Iowa Code section 280.22, the Student Free Expression Law, and therefore were within the students’ right of free expression under that statute.

Iowa Code section 280.22 provides, in pertinent part:

1. Except as limited by this section, students of the public schools have the right to exercise freedom of speech, including the right of expression in official school publications.

2. Students shall not express, publish, or distribute any of the following:

a. Materials which are obscene.

b. Materials which are libelous or slanderous under chapter 659.

c. Materials which encourage students to do any of the following:

(1) Commit unlawful acts.

(2) Violate lawful school regulations.

(3) Cause the material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.

3. There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for official school publications except when the material violates this section.

. . . .

5. Student editors of official school publications shall assign and edit the news, editorial, and feature content of their publications subject to the limitations of this section. Journalism advisors of students producing official school publications shall supervise the production of the student staff, to maintain professional standards of English and journalism, and to comply with this section (emphasis added).

The trial court granted summary judgment to the school defendants, concluding that the articles, though not libelous, encouraged students to “potentially commit unlawful acts, violate school regulations, or cause material and substantial disruption to the orderly operation of the school.” It also found that section 280.22 codified the student speech standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.

Lange appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 280.22 when it “assum[ed]” the state legislature intended to codify the federal free-speech constitutional standard articulated in Hazelwood and stated that caselaw interpreting the First Amendment “must be factored into the interpretation of the Iowa statute.” He asserted that, in enacting section 280.22, the state legislature rejected the federal approach articulated in Hazelwood and created broader free-speech rights for students .

Ruling/Rationale: The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed with Lange.  It reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to it with instructions to direct ACSD to remove the reprimands from Lange’s personnel file. Because ACSD’s reprimands were based on the student publications having run afoul of section 280.22, it was necessary for the court to interpret that statute for the first time.

First, the appellate court rejected the defendants’ contention and the trial court’s conclusion that the state legislature intended to codify the holding in Hazelwood. Instead, it was “persuaded [that the legislature enacted the law for] the purpose of giving students more robust free-expression rights than those articulated by the Supreme Court” in Hazelwood. The court cited the uniform agreement of commentators, including the Student Press Law Center (SPLC), in support of its conclusion. A 2007 SPLC publication, noted that “[s]ince [the Hazelwood] decision, seven states—Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts and Oregon—have passed laws that limit the effects of the Hazelwood decision in their states and return a greater degree of press freedom to student editors.”

The appellate court next determined that based on the accepted definition of “encourage,” none of the language in the articles cited by the defendants as objectionable actually encouraged “students to commit unlawful acts, violate lawful school regulations, or cause the material and substantial disruption of the orderly operation of school in contravention of section 280.22(2)(c).”

The appellate court then turned to the question of whether any of the articles cited by the defendants were libelous in contravention of section 280.22(2)(b). It agreed with the trial court that the articles were not libelous because Lange had properly raised and shown the affirmative defense of consent. It also noted that the affirmative defense of truth barred a finding of libel.

Lastly, the appellate court declined to reach the merits of the defendants’ argument that the newspaper editions “‘failed to maintain professional standards of journalism’” as required by the state statute.   Noting that the defendants had “articulated only conclusory arguments,” and “[b]ecause [ACSD] and Diercks do not explain how the content contravenes the professional standards—or what those standards even are—we conclude the argument is too vague to address.”

Lange v. Diercks, No. 11-0191 (Iowa App. Ct. Nov. 9, 2011)

[Editor's Note: For a contrary ruling, see the May 2011 Legal Clips summary of a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (NY, VT, CT) decision in R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist. There, the panel held that school officials did not violate students’ free speech rights when they refused to allow the student newspaper to run a sexually explicit cartoon accompanying an article about sex education.  

The panel found that the officials were justified in regulating such speech under the standards established in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986), which affords schools wide discretion to prohibit speech that is “lewd, indecent, or offensive,” and Hazelwood, which permits schools to censor school-sponsored speech in ways “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”]

 



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